Abstract-Despite the inroads that public-key cryptography has made on the web, the difficulty of key management has for the most part kept it out of the hands of the general public. With keydistribution software for PGP beginning to natively support the anonymizing service Tor, we describe a protocol to take advantage of this, allowing users and identity holders to detect malicious keyservers with an known and arbitrarily small probability of failure, allowing users to safely exchange public keys across the internet without the need for certificate authorities.
I. INTRODUCTION
Suppose you want to send a letter to someone, but do not know their address. How do you find it? The obvious way is to look them up in a phone book, but then the phone company might have placed a different address under their name. If they are particularly security conscious, then you might presume that, when they received their phone book, they checked to see whether their address is correct. But what if it were not modified in every phone book, but some contain the real address and some contain a false one?
Our proposed solution is as follows: we each visit several random houses and check our own addresses in their phone books. Should some or all of them be incorrect, we can publically announce the fact, perhaps to a competiting phone company who would relish the opportunity to spread news of their rival's error or deception as widely as possible. Should they all be identical, we have some assurance that the number of deviant phone books cannot be too large.
Then, to find out the address to which we send our letter, we do not look simply in our own phone book, but again look it up in a number of randomly selected phone books. This allows us to convince ourselves-to a degree-that we are not taking the address from a potentially deviant copy.
As we will see, this type of protocol, where the sender and recipient both randomly sample copies of a database, provides a method to statistically guarantee its accuracy. This has many applications, however we will discuss its use as a method of cryptographic key distribution.
The ubiquity of the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol [1] might lead one to believe that public-key infrastructure has solved the problem of key distribution; however, despite the near-universal availability of TLS on the client side and increasing adoption by websites, cryptographically secure messaging systems remain something of a rarity, with plaintext generally being entrusted to service providers.
That is not to say, however, that security capabilities have not advanced in the last decade; anonymizing relay services [2] such as Tor [3] , have made it possible for the general public to access services on the internet without revealing their identity. Nonetheless, the authentication of services such as email has not significantly progressed in recent years.
The most widely-deployed systems such as Secure Shell (SSH) [4] tend to use a trust-on-first-use [5] model, in which initial communication takes place with either no or only manual authentication, after which the the user is alerted to key changes. However, this does not prove the identity of the user unless the two parties use some out-of-band authentication method.
This can be overcome by standards such as S/MIME [6] , which use signed certificates to verify identities: S/MIME is widely adopted by email clients, but the need to acquire certificates from a commercial certificate authority has prevented it from receiving any significant use. Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) [7] aims to provide message-level security to the masses, but has been hampered by the difficulty of its key management, which depends upon personal contact to establish trust relationships.
Identity-based cryptography provides another approach, in which in a key trust needs only be established at the organizational level rather than between individual users, though bringing with it other drawbacks.
These strong schemes have many theoretical similarities, but differ substantially in their implementation. We will briefly discuss some of their advantages and disadvantages in order to demonstrate why we seek an alternative solution.
A. Public key infrastructure
Authentication on the web is achieved with the aid of certificate authorities (CAs) who are entrusted with the task of identity verification. This can take place in a variety of ways and with varying degrees of rigor, but whatever the means of verification, the CA issues the user with a certificate [8] that allows them to prove that their identity is validated.
Provided trust can be established in the certificate authority-a relatively straightforward task given their small number-this solves the problem, provided that one trusts the verification process carried out by the CA.
Unfortunately, this assumption does not always hold in practice; compromised CAs have issued rogue certificates on a number of occasions, and in order to revoke them they must either be recorded by the CA's auditing process or be detected in the wild. If auditing systems are bypassed or nonexistent, then users have little choice but to revoke their trust in the CA, as occurred following the compromise of Dutch CA Diginotar [9] . This has inspired systems such as Certificate Transparency [10] , which make certificate issuance public in order to allow site owners to detect the issuance of false certificates.
B. Identity-based cryptosystems
Another approach uses what are known as identity-based cryptosystems [11] . These systems allow a public key to be derived from a user's identity itself, e.g. from their email address. Their main drawback is that they generally require some form of trusted third-party to generate their private keys.
The idea is as follows: a trusted third party generates key pairs for each user, with each user's public key derived from their identity. Then, to send a message to a user, one computes their public key and encrypts the message as usual. Naïvely, one might generate a common RSA modulus and select the public-key exponent to be their email address, for example, though the properties of RSA render this scheme insecure.
The risk with such schemes, however, is that the trusted third-party has access to every user's private key, and may therefore impersonate them or decrypt their messages at will. Within a single organisation this might be acceptable, but in practice it has all of the disadvantages of a CA-based system, and more-whereas a compromised CA can issue fraudulent certificates, in an identity-based scheme the attacker will gain access to the users' private keys.
C. The Web of Trust
The approach taken by PGP is to hand control of trust relationships to the users themselves; users sign the public keys of other users in order to indicate confidence in their identities; this results in a large directed graph, and trust in a key is determined by a user's ability to find paths to it from those whom they trust. No individual user has carte blanche to create certificates that will be accepted by all users, thus reducing the risk posed by compromise of a certificate authority.
This may work when users are motivated to take part in building the web of trust; the Debian project, for example, requires that one have their keys signed by a certain number of existing participants in order to take part [12, §2] . This level of dedication is not realistic for the vast majority of users, and therefore an automated system is necessary.
D. Our approach
The idea that we present in this paper is that data integrity is a side-effect of anonymity. This technique is related to multipath probing [5] ; for example, the website of the anonymityproviding service Tor suggests that it might be used in order to ensure that one is receiving the same information as the public [13] ; an automated system [14] has been suggested that use of Tor to check for man-in-the-middle attacks when suspicious certificates have been presented by a server, whereas [5] suggests the use of dedicated notary servers that will keep a record of all certificates visible online.
However, these types of system presuppose that it is possible to directly reach the other party via the second path. Often this is not the case, for example when we seek to authenticate data that the user has published on a third-party hosting service. In this case, we must depend upon the original user to verify the data themselves via the anonymyzing network.
Essentially, with careful design of the client software, an anonymizing network allows data to be verified from the point of view of a randomly-selected user. This allows us to establish probabilistic bounds on the probability that a malicious party will successfully provide false data to a user without detection.
After defining exactly what we mean by anonymity, we will use the concept to calculate an upper bound on the probability that a service, such as a website or keyserver, can successfully provide different keys to different users.
II. ANONYMITY
Anonymity is a relatively vague concept, and our requirements are somewhat atypical. The most popular anonymizing service by far is Tor, described in Figure 1 , which has as a goal to prevent users from being deanonymized over the long term [3] . This is a reasonable target, given that one of Tor's stated purposes is the protection of dissidents and journalistic sources from state-level adversaries. Compromising a single request over the course of many years might well result in catastrophic consequences for the user; even if that single request does not contain any compromising information, it may tie them to a pseudonym-e.g. a social media account whose activities are known. As an example of this, the head of the hacking group LulzSec was arrested after connecting to an online chat server on just a single occasion without using Tor [15] .
Our requirements are different-whereas a dissident, leaker, or criminal desires to minimise the probability that they will ever be deanonymized, our desire is to minimise the probability that an individual request is deanonymized, since the security of the design that we will describe shortly is determined by the number of requests that can be made without being connected to one another. We will discuss this distinction in greater detail in Section II-A, but it is important to highlight that what we describe is only one of many possible definitions of anonymity that has been chosen to meet our needs.
A. Adversary model
Our definition of anonymity can be broadly described as the statement that if a number of users each make a request to a service, then the service should be unable to determine which user made which request with probability better than chance. From the user's perspective, this means that the adversary Connecting to a public keyserver via Tor. The user randomly selects several relays, then adds a layer of encryption for each relay. After receiving a message, the relays strip their layer of encryption, revealing the address of the next relay. Eventually, the message reaches an exit node, which passes it to the open internet. Only a small number of Tor nodes are exit nodes-about one in seven at the time of writing [16] . Anyone can contribute nodes to the network-including adversaries-however as the routing path is selected by the user, an attacker cannot gain access to the encrypted messages with probability better than chance.
may modify any data that it has sent or received, but that he is unable to do so in such a way as to target a particular user. Whether the adversary has compromised the service or controls some or all Tor exit nodes is immaterial; all we require is that he cannot deanonymize the requests in time to send messages tailored to a particular user.
We furthermore posit the existence of some global channel that allows a user to warn others that a fault has occurred. We argue that this is a legitimate assumption, since failures can be provided to third-party reporting services or, if all else fails, manually sent via email to a public mailing list.
Definition 1. Anonymity
Suppose a set of users {U i } = U 1 , . . . , U N each make a series of M identical requests R i [k] to a service.
Then, we call the service anonymous if given the sources of requests
it is unable to determine of the sources of requests
with a probability greater than
This definition makes the assumption that all users operate in lockstep, masking their identities by making identical requests, with covert channels such as clock error sufficiently masked that the probability of successfully connecting consecutive requests is no better than chance. We will discuss in Section V-A how this might be achieved in practice using Tor.
While this definition makes clear the capabilities of the adversary, it is not ideal for calculation. We will thus make extensive use of the following theorem: Theorem 1. Suppose an anonymous service receives a request from each of N users, and responds to each with a message m 1 , . . . , m N . Then, the recipients (U i k ) N k=1 of message m k will be uniformly distributed, each having probability (N !) −1 , and subsequent rounds are independent of one another.
Proof: We proceed by contradiction. Suppose that, given the sources of all previous requests, for some choice of {i k } the anonymous service is able to respond to the requests in such a way that
This is without loss of generality, as if the inequality holds in the reverse direction then the law of total probability demands that there must be some other mapping from messages to users for which it occurs as shown.
We construct an estimator mapping the i-th request to U i k . By the assumed inequality, this is correct with a probability greater than (N !) −1 , contradicting the definition of an anonymous service. The recipients of the messages are thus uniformly distributed.
In order to demonstrate independence, let us consider an arbitrary subsequent round of communication, and specifically let us suppose that
As before, we may construct a source estimator by mapping request i to user U i k . According to the definition of an anonymous service, this cannot succeed with probability greater than (N !) −1 even with knowledge of the sources of all previous requests, and thus by contradiction our supposition that the conditional distribution is nonuniform must be false. Thus,
1 N ! and so the message-recipient mappings are independent. We have conditioned upon only a single prior round, however the same argument holds for arbitrary sets of previous rounds.
It is this 'mixing' property that we use to provide security. Any response sent by the service will be received with equal probability by all of its users, and thus it cannot reliably provide auditors with a different set of records.
III. VERIFICATION PROTOCOL
Suppose that Alice wishes to broadcast a message via an untrusted service, which Bob wishes to receive. The protocol that we propose is as follows:
1) Alice sends a copy of her message to the anonymous service to be broadcast. 2) At a predetermined time, Alice and Bob both request a copy of the message from the service.
3) The service responds with the message. 4) Steps two and three are repeated a specified number of times. 5) If the values that Alice or Bob receive are not identical, they signal an error. 6) Alice checks that the messages that she has received are all identical to that which she provided to the service. If not, she signals an error.
A. Analysis of the verification protocol
We now proceed to analyze the protocol described. Suppose N users each make M identical requests to the anonymous service. It responds with K copies of Alice's message, and N − K false messages, which need not be identical. These messages will be uniformly distributed amongst the users, as shown in Theorem 1. Lemma 1. When the described protocol is run with more than two users, the maximum probability of false acceptance occurs is achieved when only a single false value is transmitted.
Proof: Suppose the service transmits false values {x , x , . . .}. Then, if every false response is replaced with x , every sequence of transmissions that results in a false value being accepted will result in x being accepted. Thus the maximum probability of false acceptance is achieved by a service transmitting only the true value x and a single false value x . This lemma is extremely useful when bounding the probability of acceptance, as it permits us to consider only two possible responses: the true response, and the false response. The goal of the attacker, then, is that Alice receives the true response every time, and that Bob receives the false response every time. Should Definition 1 hold, this is exceedingly unlikely, as we show in Lemma 2.
Lemma 2. Suppose N users take part in the described protocol exactly once, including Alice and Bob. The service provides K copies of Alice's intended message x, and N − K copies of a false message x . Then Bob will receive the false value x and Alice the true value x with probability
Proof: A rigorous justification is given in the appendix, however this can be treated as a problem of pulling balls from an urn: given an urn containing K white balls and N − K black balls, false acceptance is equivalent to drawing first a white ball-probability K/N -and then a black ballprobability (N − K)/(N − 1)-resulting in a joint probability of
Theorem 2. Integrity of data broadcast by an anonymous service. Suppose N users take part in the described protocol, including Alice and Bob. Then, after M iterations Bob will accept a false value x without detection by Alice with probability at most
Proof: In order for Bob to accept a false value without detection by Alice, the service must succeed all M times in sending x to Alice and some other value x to Bob. Lemma 1 indicates that the maximum probability of success occurs when only a single false value is emitted, so we assume that all responses are either x or x .
Suppose that in round i, the service responds K i times with x and N − K i times with x .
The probability that Alice receives x and Bob x is given by Lemma 2 as
and the probability of Bob accepting the false key without Alice noticing is therefore
This is maximised by setting
when N is odd, K i can be rounded in either direction by the attacker-rounding up is more likely to result in the true value being accepted, whereas rounding down increases the likelihood of rejection.
The maximum probability of a successful attack is therefore
As Alice and Bob are unaware of the number of other users accessing the service, they must assume the worst-case value of N = 2. This gives p max = 2 −M . As the number of users increases, the probability will approach 4 −M , however this is the probability of false acceptance for a single user, and so does not take into account the possibility that other users would detect the substitution and report it publicly, rendering it highly pessimistic.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION
We have developed an implementation of this system, which we have dubbed Keywatch [17] . It takes the form of a command-line program that continuously searches for an email address on an HKP keyserver [18] via Tor.
Requests are made via libcurl, using Tor's authentication isolation feature [19, IsolateSocksAuth] feature to force the creation of new channels. Connections are made using plain HTTP, reducing the potential for fingerprinting by the client's TLS configuration and round-trip times. The client is relied on to have a sufficiently accurate clock, which is used to determine the time window for each round of the protocol. The windows are 10 s in duration, and defined to start at integer numbers of periods since 2000-01-01 0000 GMT. This duration is short and only suitable for testing; before leaving the prototype stage, it will be lengthened to several minutes.
Within each window, the time of each request is chosen at random according to X n T /2 64 , where T is the window duration and X n is a random number between 0 and 2 64 − 1 found by filling a 64-bit unsigned integer with bytes from the operating-system cryptographic random-number generator.
After the index is downloaded, the fingerprint associated with the email address is taken to be that of the first validthat is to say, unrevoked and unexpired-key to which the email address is associated. Once such a fingerprint has been received, it is retained in memory and compared with the first valid fingerprint from each subsequent request. Should they differ, the key provided by the offending request will be printed to the terminal.
V. DISCUSSION
We have presented a protocol that uses an anonymizing service to create an auditable broadcast service. This is extremely valuable, as it provides a partial solution to the problem of public key distribution for individuals. If those accessing key distribution services can be properly anonymized, it allows holders of a key to verify that it has not been interfered with. Furthermore, if there exist only a relatively small number of locations from which the majority of users are expected to acquire public keys, then it becomes feasible for one to verify the keys distributed by each of them.
The requirement that the holder of an identity takes part is an onerous one, but one that could be met should such a technique become ubiquitous, for example if it is performed automatically by default installations of PGP implementations by all major vendors. Even if this were not the case, the approach still serves to reassure the holder of an identity that other users can communicate securely with them.
A. Anonymization methods
The question of how to perform the anonymization is not as straightforward as it might first appear. Tor may render difficult the task of determining which sites a user visits, or conversely which users are visiting a site, our requirement for anonymity at the level of individual requests is more difficult. The first and most obvious point is that Tor channels are reused for ten minutes at a time, and therefore client software must demand a new channel for every request in order to avoid their anonymity being reduced to pseudonymity. Even so, users must be exceedingly careful if they are to avoid giving information away via fingerprinting of their client software.
One risk is that information will be leaked via timing attacks; if the requests are made at a fixed time, then the order in which the server receives the requests may allow it to link the requests by the clock error of each user. The time of each request must therefore be randomised, as must the times at which channels are set up.
Client software poses a risk as well-if the service being audited uses HTTPS, it might attempt to fingerprint a user by its available cipher suites, or by the time needed for negotiation to take place.
A possibly more secure approach would be to use some kind of protocol that responds to a single fixed datagram packet, however as Tor does not support UDP, this approach would require the use of some other anonymizing network. Nonetheless, with careful design it will be possible to reduce the information leakage to a level that sufficiently masks the source of each request.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have shown how an anonymizing service such as Tor can be used to perform multi-path probing, and so create a public broadcast channel that permits the sending party to bound the probability with which an attacker is able to substitute an alternative message. This same bound can be used by recipients if their desired sender is known to take part and can publicly signal an error. Failed attempts to provide different messages to different parties can be proven by the detecting party with the aid of digital signatures. Such a channel has the potential to provide remote verification of public keys, rendering end-to-end public-key cryptography possible without the need for trust in certificate authorities or for potentially insecure methods such as trust-on-first-use. APPENDIX PROOF OF LEMMA 2 Lemma 2. Suppose N users take part in the described protocol exactly once, including Alice and Bob. The service provides K copies of Alice's intended message x, and N − K copies of a false message x . Then Bob will receive the false value x and Alice the true value x with probability
.
Proof: By Theorem 1, the joint distribution of message recipients is uniform. We therefore proceed by writing the probability of false acceptance as the sum of the probabilities of message recipients and count the terms.
Let X i denote the message number received by user i, with Alice and Bob, having numbers i = 1 and i = 2 respectively. Furthermore, suppose that the message x is sent to the set of users U and x to users V . Then, the probability of false acceptance is given by where S N is the set of permutations on a set of size N . This summation has (N − 2)! terms, and thus
Therefore,
and given that U and V contain K and N − K users respectively,
